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be7edfd180
The webhook signature verifier used to fall open with a warning log
when META_APP_SECRET was unset — a deliberate soft-rollout choice that
is unsafe for a public template. A forker who forgets the env var
would be running a fully spoofable webhook: anyone knowing the URL
could POST fabricated status updates and drift broadcast counts.
Now:
- `verifyMetaWebhookSignature` returns false when the secret is missing
and logs at error level, so the route responds 401 to every POST
until the operator configures it.
- Docs mark META_APP_SECRET as **required**:
- docs/environment-variables.md lists it under Required, not
Recommended.
- docs/whatsapp-setup.md §6 is now "Signature verification (required)".
- docs/troubleshooting.md updated accordingly.
- .env.local.example lists the var with guidance on where to find it.
Also fixes a pre-existing gitignore bug: `.env*` was swallowing
`.env.local.example`, which meant forkers running
`cp .env.local.example .env.local` from the getting-started guide
hit "no such file". Added a negation for `*.example`.
Upgrade note for existing deploys: set META_APP_SECRET (Meta → App
Settings → Basic → App Secret) before updating, or inbound webhooks
will 401 until it's configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'node:crypto'
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/**
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* Verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature Meta attaches to webhook POSTs.
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*
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* Meta signs the raw request body with your App Secret and sends the
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* result in the `x-hub-signature-256: sha256=<hex>` header. Without
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* verification, anyone who knows our webhook URL can POST fabricated
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* status updates and drift broadcast counts arbitrarily.
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*
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* Reference:
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* https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/webhooks/getting-started#verify-payloads
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*
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* Contract:
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* `META_APP_SECRET` is **required**. If it's missing we fail closed —
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* every request is rejected until the operator configures the
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* secret. A previous version fell open with a warning log, which is
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* unsafe for a public template: anyone who forgets the env var would
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* be running a fully spoofable webhook.
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*/
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export function verifyMetaWebhookSignature(
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rawBody: string,
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signatureHeader: string | null,
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): boolean {
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const secret = process.env.META_APP_SECRET
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if (!secret) {
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console.error(
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'[webhook] META_APP_SECRET is not set — rejecting request. ' +
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'Configure the env var (Meta → App Settings → Basic → App Secret) ' +
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'to enable signature verification.',
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)
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return false
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}
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if (!signatureHeader) return false
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if (!signatureHeader.startsWith('sha256=')) return false
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const expected =
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'sha256=' +
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crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(rawBody).digest('hex')
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const a = Buffer.from(signatureHeader)
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const b = Buffer.from(expected)
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// Bail if lengths differ — timingSafeEqual throws otherwise.
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)
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}
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