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b013861160
PR 4 of the multi-user accounts series. Lands the link-only
invitation flow — admin generates a shareable URL, copies it,
sends it via any channel. No email service needed.
API surface
- GET /api/account/invitations — list pending (admin+)
- POST /api/account/invitations — create (admin+)
- DELETE /api/account/invitations/[id] — revoke (admin+)
- GET /api/invitations/[token]/peek — public, rate-limited per-IP
- POST /api/invitations/[token]/redeem — authenticated, rate-limited per-IP
Token lifecycle
- POST returns the plaintext token + share URL exactly ONCE in
the response. We store only the SHA-256 hash. There is no
endpoint that resurfaces it; if the admin dismisses the dialog
without copying, the only recourse is to revoke and re-issue.
- Peek and redeem take the plaintext token in the URL path, hash
it in TS via `hashInviteToken`, and look up by `token_hash`.
Two new SECURITY DEFINER RPCs back the cross-RLS work
(migration 019):
- `peek_invitation` — anonymous read. Returns a uniform JSON
envelope: `{ ok, account_name, role, expires_at }` or
`{ ok: false, reason: not_found|used|expired }`. The route
forwards verbatim so the join page can branch cleanly.
- `redeem_invitation` — authenticated. Locks the invite row
`FOR UPDATE`, validates expiry/usage, refuses if the caller is
already in a shared account OR their personal account has any
domain rows (checked across all 11 user-creatable parent
tables), then atomically moves profile.account_id +
account_role, stamps the invitation accepted, and deletes the
orphan personal account. Single transaction.
Error contract
- 22023 (invalid_parameter_value) → 400 — not_found / used / expired
- 42501 (insufficient_privilege) → 401 — caller not authenticated
- 23505 (unique_violation, reused) → 409 — caller's account has data,
or they're already a
member of the inviter's
account / another shared
account
Rate limiting
- Two new buckets in `RATE_LIMITS`: invitationPeek (30/min/IP)
and invitationRedeem (10/min/IP). Belt-and-braces against
token enumeration even though 256-bit entropy makes it
theoretical. Uses the existing fixed-window in-memory limiter.
Why no peek-then-redeem two-step on the server
- Peek is read-only and idempotent; redeem locks `FOR UPDATE` so
two concurrent redemptions can't both win. The peek result is
cosmetic ("show me what I'm joining"); the actual write
happens entirely inside the redeem RPC's transaction, so a
TOCTOU between peek and redeem just means the user sees the
same `{ ok: false, reason }` on the next render.
Verification
- `npm run lint` → 0 errors (same 20 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test` → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build` → succeeds; the 4 new routes register as ƒ
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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