Commit Graph

21 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Arnas Donauskas
c736e7a43f feat(ai): add token-usage dashboard (AI Agents → Usage)
Surfaces the ai_usage_log data added in the previous commit:
- GET /api/ai/usage — admin-only aggregation (totals, per-mode,
  per-model, zero-filled daily series) over a 7/30/90-day window,
  mirroring the ai_usage_log SELECT policy
- AiUsageCard — stat tiles + daily token bar chart + by-model list,
  rendered under a new admin-only "Usage" tab on the AI Agents page

Counts only; no message content is stored or shown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 14:31:36 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
b0194dfc27 feat(ai): polish auto-reply — inbox controls, real handoff, usage logging
Makes the AI auto-reply bot visible and controllable from the inbox,
completes the handoff, and records token spend. Builds on the existing
lib/ai engine rather than replacing it.

Track A — user-facing
- messages.ai_generated flag → small "AI" badge on bot-generated bubbles
- "Take over" / "Resume AI" banner per conversation
  (POST /api/ai/autoreply/[id]) — take-over pauses + assigns to the agent
- handoff now assigns to a configurable target (agent or unassigned
  queue) and writes an internal note summarizing the exchange; the
  existing on_conversation_assigned trigger notifies the assignee
- Settings → AI: "Hand off to" target picker

Track B — observability + safety
- providers return normalized token usage; logged per run to ai_usage_log
  (admin-readable) from both auto-reply and draft
- account-wide auto-reply rate limit (30/min) on top of the
  per-conversation cap

Migration: 033_ai_reply_polish.sql (messages.ai_generated,
ai_configs.handoff_agent_id, conversations.ai_handoff_summary,
ai_usage_log). Tests + typecheck + lint pass (607 tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 14:03:33 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
10d31bcfc8 feat: AI Agents sidebar section (setup + playground)
Promotes the AI assistant out of Settings into a first-class "AI Agents"
sidebar area.

- Sidebar: new "AI Agents" item → /agents.
- /agents page with two tabs:
  - Playground — a test chat (POST /api/ai/playground) that runs the
    real auto-reply path (KB retrieval + provider, auto_reply prompt,
    multi-turn, shows handoff). loadAiConfig gains requireActive so you
    can test before enabling.
  - Setup — the existing provider/key + knowledge-base config, relocated.
- Removed the AI section from Settings (settings-sections + page); same
  account config, new home. No migration.

Tests +6 (query, loadAiConfig requireActive). 593 pass; typecheck, lint,
build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 18:20:18 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
ce1fa4705d feat: AI knowledge base (RAG grounding)
Grounds the AI assistant (0.5.0) in the account's own content so it can
answer instead of handing off.

- Hybrid retrieval: Postgres full-text search for every account; optional
  semantic search (pgvector + OpenAI text-embedding-3-small) when an
  embeddings key is set. Semantic-primary, topped up with FTS.
- src/lib/ai: chunk, embeddings, knowledge (ingest + retrieve), query;
  buildSystemPrompt gains a knowledge block; config carries an
  (optional) embeddings key.
- Wired into /api/ai/draft and the auto-reply bot (best-effort — never
  blocks a reply).
- KB API (/api/ai/knowledge CRUD + /reindex) and a Settings → AI
  Assistant knowledge-base manager + embeddings-key field.
- Migration 030: pgvector, ai_knowledge_documents, ai_knowledge_chunks
  (fts + embedding), match RPCs, ai_configs.embeddings_api_key.

Migration required: supabase/migrations/030_ai_knowledge.sql.
Stacked on feat/ai-reply-assistant (#329).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 17:06:09 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
2748028c1d feat: AI reply assistant (bring-your-own-key)
Adds an AI reply assistant powered by the account's own OpenAI or
Anthropic key (stored AES-256-GCM-encrypted; no per-seat AI fee).

- AI-drafted replies in the inbox composer (✨ button, agent+), via
  read-only POST /api/ai/draft.
- Optional auto-reply bot on inbound messages that no Flow consumed and
  no agent owns, with a per-conversation cap and clean [[HANDOFF]] to a
  human. Stands down when a message-level automation would also reply.
- Settings → AI Assistant (admin+): provider/model, key, business
  context, toggles, and a Test-key button that verifies before saving.
- Provider layer (src/lib/ai) with OpenAI + Anthropic adapters behind
  one interface; migration 029 (ai_configs + per-conversation columns +
  atomic claim_ai_reply_slot RPC).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 12:56:04 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
c0f390c401 feat(api): outbound event webhooks — /api/v1/webhooks (#245)
Completes the public API roadmap (#245): register HTTPS endpoints to be
POSTed to when things happen in an account, so automations can react to
inbound activity instead of polling.

- Migration 028: account-scoped webhook_endpoints (secret stored
  AES-GCM-encrypted) + an atomic record_webhook_failure() function.
- Scope webhooks:manage; management API GET/POST /api/v1/webhooks and
  GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/webhooks/{id} (secret returned once).
- Events message.received / conversation.created / message.status_updated
  dispatched from the inbound webhook handler's after() block.
- Signed delivery (X-Wacrm-Signature = HMAC-SHA256 over t.body), single
  best-effort attempt, auto-disable after consecutive failures.
- Versioned 0.4.0; docs/public-api.md Webhooks section; CHANGELOG.

Fixes from the adversarial code review of this diff:
- SSRF: block private/loopback/link-local (incl. cloud metadata) targets
  at delivery time + redirect:'manual' so a public URL can't bounce
  internal (src/lib/webhooks/ssrf.ts).
- Status mirror UPDATE no longer uses .select().maybeSingle() (message_id
  is non-unique); account resolved via a bounded limit(1) read.
- Atomic failure counter via SQL RPC (was a racy read-modify-write).
- conversation.created emitted before the reaction short-circuit.
- Per-delivery id added for receiver dedupe; docs state at-least-once /
  unordered delivery.
- Signature verify tolerates hex case / header whitespace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 14:53:18 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
8cb5792823 feat(api): public REST API v1 — messages, contacts, conversations, broadcasts (#245)
Complete the public API roadmap on top of the existing key-auth layer
(#290). Re-lands POST /api/v1/messages (lost when the stacked #291 never
reached main) by extracting the dashboard send route's core into
`sendMessageToConversation`, then adds:

- Contacts: GET/POST /api/v1/contacts, GET/PATCH /api/v1/contacts/{id}
- Conversations: GET list + /{id} + /{id}/messages
- Broadcasts: POST /api/v1/broadcasts + GET /{id} (persist rows, fan out
  in after(), poll for status)

All list endpoints share one keyset-pagination contract
({ data, meta: { next_cursor } }). No migration required — scopes and
tables already exist. Versioned as 0.3.0 (folded into [Unreleased]);
docs/public-api.md updated; outbound webhooks left as the sole roadmap
item. API stays v1 (additive).

Includes fixes from an adversarial code review: cursor validation
against filter injection, broadcast counts deferred to the DB aggregate
trigger, terminal broadcast status reflects failures, duplicate-phone
de-dup, up-front send-param validation (no orphan conversations),
PATCH null-clear semantics, error-checked tag sync, bounded tag filter,
unified audit-user attribution, and a maxDuration on the broadcast
fan-out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 14:10:19 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
456321a2f2
feat(api): public API groundwork — scoped API keys + /api/v1/me
Adds the machine-to-machine auth layer the public REST API needs so
external scripts and automations can drive wacrm (issue #245). This is
the groundwork release; data endpoints land one at a time on top of it.

- Migration 026: account-scoped `api_keys` table. SHA-256 hash at rest
  (plaintext shown once), display `key_prefix`, `scopes[]`, RLS via
  `is_account_member` (members read, admin+ manage).
- `src/lib/api-keys/`: key gen/hash (wacrm_live_ prefix, timing-safe),
  scope vocabulary, service-role auth-path store.
- `requireApiKey(request, scope?)` (src/lib/auth/api-context.ts):
  bearer parse -> hash lookup -> liveness -> per-key rate limit ->
  scopes-only authz. Returns a service-role-scoped account context.
- `/api/v1` envelope ({data} / {error:{code,message}}) + GET /api/v1/me
  reference endpoint that exercises the whole stack.
- Dashboard: admin+ key management routes + Settings -> API keys tab.
- Docs (docs/public-api.md), CHANGELOG, README, .env note.

Checks: typecheck clean, lint 0 errors, full suite green (+27 tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 15:35:43 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
3dce1b56cd
feat(contacts): prevent duplicate phone numbers on create/import (#212)
The same phone could become multiple contacts: only the WhatsApp
webhook de-duped, while manual create and CSV import inserted raw
un-normalized phones, and the DB had no uniqueness. That fragmented
conversations, deals, and tags across duplicates.

- Migration 022: generated `contacts.phone_normalized` (digits-only),
  a one-shot `merge_duplicate_contacts()` that collapses existing
  dupes into the oldest row (re-pointing conversations, deals, notes,
  tags, custom values, broadcast recipients — no data loss), then a
  UNIQUE (account_id, phone_normalized) index as the authoritative
  guarantee for every write path.
- Shared `src/lib/contacts/dedupe.ts`: findExistingContact (suffix
  prefilter + phonesMatch), isExactMatch, isUniqueViolation,
  dedupeByPhone. The webhook now reuses findExistingContact (and
  recovers from a unique-violation race instead of dropping the
  message).
- Contact form: on-blur duplicate check — hard-block + "view existing"
  link on an exact match, soft warning on a trunk-variant near-match;
  unique-violation backstop on submit.
- CSV import: de-dupes within the file and against existing contacts,
  reports "imported / skipped / failed", treats 23505 as skipped.
- Contact type gains account_id (was missing) + phone_normalized.
- Unit tests for the dedupe helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 15:52:38 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
d1b64ac0b8
docs(changelog): note configurable default deal currency (#218)
Adds the Unreleased entry for the per-account default currency under
Added, plus a "Migration required" note for 021 with the
apply-before-deploy warning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 15:23:14 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
5332f77831
feat(members): GA the Members tab — remove account_sharing beta gate
The multi-user account-sharing surface (Members tab + invite/role
management APIs + /join redeem flow) is complete, so drop the
`account_sharing` beta flag that hid it during development. Mirrors
the Flows soft-GA in 0.2.0.

- settings: Members tab is now always rendered (no beta_features
  check, no stale-link fallback). The `profiles.beta_features`
  column itself stays for future betas.
- sidebar: the active-account strip no longer keys off the flag.
  It now shows whenever the account name differs from the user's
  own name — i.e. once you've renamed the account or joined a
  shared one — preserving the original "don't duplicate a solo
  user's name" behaviour without the flag.
- CHANGELOG/README: document Members as a shipped, all-users
  feature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 17:39:46 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
55da996e52
perf(db,webhook): backend follow-ups from the multi-user review
PR A of the post-review fix series. Addresses the two must-fix
backend findings (flow-media account scoping; webhook contact
lookup at scale) plus the two should-fix composite-index
additions, all in one migration + two TS files.

Migration 020 (`supabase/migrations/020_account_sharing_followups.sql`)
- Composite partial index `idx_automations_account_active_trigger`
  on `automations(account_id, trigger_type) WHERE is_active`.
  The 006-era partial index was account-blind so the planner had
  to post-filter by account_id on every webhook dispatch. With
  100+ admins in a shared account the post-filter step shows up
  in query plans; this index answers all three predicates from
  one lookup.
- Same shape for flows: `idx_flows_account_active` on
  `flows(account_id) WHERE status='active'` — paired to the
  `findEntryFlow` query in the runner.
- `flow-media` storage RLS rewritten to allow uploads / updates
  / deletes by any member of the account whose folder name
  matches `account-<account_id>/...`. Legacy `<auth.uid()>/...`
  paths remain writable by the original uploader so files
  uploaded pre-020 don't break. Reads stay public (the bucket
  was already public so Meta can fetch URLs without creds).

Webhook contact lookup (`src/app/api/whatsapp/webhook/route.ts`)
- The PR-8 conversion swapped `eq('user_id', userId)` for
  `eq('account_id', accountId)` but kept "pull every row, filter
  in JS" semantics. That was fine when account = one user but
  scales linearly with the team size × per-user contact count.
- Now pre-filters in SQL by the phone's last-8-digit suffix
  (mirroring `phonesMatch`'s trunk-prefix tolerance). The
  trailing-suffix `like` can't use a B-tree index, but the
  account_id filter on top of `idx_contacts_account` keeps
  the scan to a small account-scoped subset. Re-applies the
  strict `phonesMatch` check in JS on the candidate set for
  correctness — typically 0-2 rows, basically free.

Flow-media upload path (`src/components/flows/forms/node-config-form.tsx`)
- Resolves the caller's `profile.account_id` before upload and
  pathes the file under `account-<account_id>/...` to match the
  new 020 RLS policy. Legacy `<user_id>/...` paths keep working
  via the back-compat clause in the policy.

Verification
- `npm run lint`      → 0 errors (same 19 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test`          → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build`     → succeeds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 19:18:58 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
14cdbf457b
feat(ui): role-aware gating sweep + account-name in sidebar
PR 9 of the multi-user accounts series — the final piece. Visual
polish so non-owners see consistent disabled states across the
app and so every user always knows which account they're acting in.

Sidebar
- New account-name strip above the user dropdown, gated behind
  the `account_sharing` beta flag (same flag the Members tab
  from PR 6 reads). For solo users (the default) the account is
  named after them, so showing it would just duplicate the user
  name below — flag-gating keeps the original layout untouched
  for single-user installs.
- When the caller's role is admin/agent/viewer (not owner), the
  role is surfaced as a small uppercase chip alongside the
  account name so they have an unambiguous signal of their
  permission level without opening Settings.
- Nav items stay always-visible per the planning doc's
  "show-but-disable" decision — hiding nav rows by role would
  make the app feel broken.

Inbox composer
- Send button + Templates button + textarea are disabled for
  viewers with a "Read-only — viewers can browse but not reply"
  placeholder and tooltip. The existing session-expired branch
  still wins when it applies (session-expired is the more
  specific condition and surfaces template-only sending).

List-page create buttons
- broadcasts/page.tsx: "New Broadcast" CTA (header + empty
  state).
- automations/page.tsx: "Create Automation" CTA.
- flows/page.tsx: "New flow" CTA (header + empty-state).
- contacts/page.tsx: "Add Contact" + "Import" CTAs.
- pipelines/page.tsx: "Add Pipeline" (gates on edit-settings —
  pipelines are settings-class under the 017 RLS) and "Add
  Deal" (gates on send-messages).

All use `useCan(...)` from PR 5. Disabled buttons get a tooltip
explaining why (`title="Read-only — your role can't ..."`).
Solo users see no visual change — single-owner accounts pass
every capability check.

Why show-but-disable, not hide
- A viewer scanning the app should still see what's possible
  in the product, both to understand what they can ask for an
  upgrade for and to avoid the UI feeling silently broken
  ("the New button just disappeared?"). The tooltip carries
  the explanation cheaply.

Verification
- `npm run lint`      → 0 errors (same 19 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test`          → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build`     → succeeds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 19:02:14 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
0ed07ee6c9
feat(webhook,engines): account-scoped routing
PR 8 of the multi-user accounts series. Flips the WhatsApp webhook,
automations engine, and flows engine from per-user tenancy to
per-account so a shared inbox actually behaves like one.

Why this matters
- Pre-this-PR: an inbound message resolved the recipient by
  whatsapp_config.user_id and dispatched only that user's
  automations / flows. Teammates joining via an invite would see
  the message in the shared inbox but their automations / flows
  never fired.
- Also fixes incipient NOT NULL violations from migration 017.
  That migration added `account_id NOT NULL` to automation_logs,
  automation_pending_executions, flow_runs, and deals. Inserts in
  the engines hadn't been updated yet — any production run would
  500 with a column violation. This PR adds account_id to every
  such insert.

Surface
- `src/app/api/whatsapp/webhook/route.ts`
  - Resolves `config.account_id` AND `config.user_id` from the
    matched whatsapp_config row. Passes accountId through every
    downstream call. user_id is kept as `configOwnerUserId` and
    used only for NOT NULL FK audit columns on contact /
    conversation inserts.
  - `findOrCreateContact` / `findOrCreateConversation` look up by
    account_id and insert with both columns.
  - `flagBroadcastReplyIfAny` matches broadcasts by account_id so
    any teammate's broadcast is updated when a customer replies.
  - `dispatchInboundToFlows` and `runAutomationsForTrigger` now
    take `accountId` instead of `userId`.
- `src/lib/automations/engine.ts`
  - `DispatchInput.userId` → `accountId`.
  - `runAutomationsForTrigger` queries automations by account_id.
  - `executeAutomation` inserts into automation_logs with both
    account_id (tenancy) and user_id (audit, from automation row).
  - `wait` step inserts into automation_pending_executions with
    account_id.
  - `create_deal` step inserts into deals with account_id.
  - `assign_conversation` / `close_conversation` /
    `resolveConversationId` filter by account_id.
  - `resumePendingExecution` row shape now includes account_id;
    cron passes it through.
  - engineSendText / engineSendTemplate calls pass
    `accountId: args.automation.account_id`.
- `src/lib/flows/engine.ts`
  - `DispatchInboundInput.userId` is kept (audit) and
    `accountId` is added (tenancy).
  - `loadActiveRunForContact`, `isDuplicateInbound`,
    `findEntryFlow` all query by account_id.
  - `startNewRun` inserts into flow_runs with account_id.
  - All `engineSend*` calls pass `accountId: run.account_id`.
- `src/lib/automations/meta-send.ts` + `src/lib/flows/meta-send.ts`
  - All four engine senders (text, template, media, interactive
    buttons/list) accept `accountId` and look up the contact +
    whatsapp_config by account_id. user_id stays for inserts.
- `src/lib/flows/types.ts`
  - `FlowRow`, `FlowRunRow`, `DispatchInboundInput` gain
    `account_id` / `accountId`.
- `src/types/index.ts`
  - `Automation` gains `account_id`. Doc note on the user_id
    field clarifying it's audit-only post-multi-user.
- `src/app/api/automations/cron/route.ts`
  - Pass account_id from the pending row to resumePendingExecution.
- `src/app/api/automations/engine/route.ts`
  - Uses `getCurrentAccount()` from #169 to resolve the caller's
    account, then dispatches with accountId.
- `CHANGELOG.md` — Fixed entry explaining the inbox / NOT NULL fix.

Backwards compatibility
- All affected tables already have account_id from migration 017.
  This PR populates it on insert paths that hadn't been updated.
- The `user_id` columns are kept everywhere — they still identify
  the agent / author for audit display. They just no longer
  enforce tenancy.

Verification
- `npm run lint`      → 0 errors (same 19 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean (had 4 errors mid-refactor; all
                        resolved by the call-site updates)
- `npm test`          → 366/366 pass (engine tests are pure unit
                        tests over helper functions; not affected)
- `npm run build`     → succeeds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 18:45:48 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
b013861160
feat(api): invitation create + peek + redeem endpoints
PR 4 of the multi-user accounts series. Lands the link-only
invitation flow — admin generates a shareable URL, copies it,
sends it via any channel. No email service needed.

API surface
- GET    /api/account/invitations              — list pending  (admin+)
- POST   /api/account/invitations              — create        (admin+)
- DELETE /api/account/invitations/[id]         — revoke        (admin+)
- GET    /api/invitations/[token]/peek         — public, rate-limited per-IP
- POST   /api/invitations/[token]/redeem       — authenticated, rate-limited per-IP

Token lifecycle
- POST returns the plaintext token + share URL exactly ONCE in
  the response. We store only the SHA-256 hash. There is no
  endpoint that resurfaces it; if the admin dismisses the dialog
  without copying, the only recourse is to revoke and re-issue.
- Peek and redeem take the plaintext token in the URL path, hash
  it in TS via `hashInviteToken`, and look up by `token_hash`.

Two new SECURITY DEFINER RPCs back the cross-RLS work
(migration 019):
- `peek_invitation` — anonymous read. Returns a uniform JSON
  envelope: `{ ok, account_name, role, expires_at }` or
  `{ ok: false, reason: not_found|used|expired }`. The route
  forwards verbatim so the join page can branch cleanly.
- `redeem_invitation` — authenticated. Locks the invite row
  `FOR UPDATE`, validates expiry/usage, refuses if the caller is
  already in a shared account OR their personal account has any
  domain rows (checked across all 11 user-creatable parent
  tables), then atomically moves profile.account_id +
  account_role, stamps the invitation accepted, and deletes the
  orphan personal account. Single transaction.

Error contract
- 22023 (invalid_parameter_value)  → 400 — not_found / used / expired
- 42501 (insufficient_privilege)   → 401 — caller not authenticated
- 23505 (unique_violation, reused) → 409 — caller's account has data,
                                           or they're already a
                                           member of the inviter's
                                           account / another shared
                                           account

Rate limiting
- Two new buckets in `RATE_LIMITS`: invitationPeek (30/min/IP)
  and invitationRedeem (10/min/IP). Belt-and-braces against
  token enumeration even though 256-bit entropy makes it
  theoretical. Uses the existing fixed-window in-memory limiter.

Why no peek-then-redeem two-step on the server
- Peek is read-only and idempotent; redeem locks `FOR UPDATE` so
  two concurrent redemptions can't both win. The peek result is
  cosmetic ("show me what I'm joining"); the actual write
  happens entirely inside the redeem RPC's transaction, so a
  TOCTOU between peek and redeem just means the user sees the
  same `{ ok: false, reason }` on the next render.

Verification
- `npm run lint`      → 0 errors (same 20 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test`          → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build`     → succeeds; the 4 new routes register as ƒ

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 17:32:46 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
0a1cf97d6b
feat(api): account + members management endpoints
PR 3 of the multi-user accounts series. Lands the server-side
endpoints the upcoming Members tab UI will call. Built on the
helpers from #169 (`requireRole`, `getCurrentAccount`,
`toErrorResponse`).

API surface
- GET    /api/account                     — caller's account + role
- PATCH  /api/account                     — rename                  (admin+)
- GET    /api/account/members             — roster; email visible to admin+ only
- PATCH  /api/account/members/[userId]    — change role             (admin+)
- DELETE /api/account/members/[userId]    — remove                  (admin+)
- POST   /api/account/transfer-ownership  — atomic owner handoff    (owner)

Member-role writes can't ride on the regular `profiles_update` RLS
policy (which only allows self-edits — admins can't modify a
teammate's row that way). The three SECURITY DEFINER RPCs in the
new migration are the scoped escape hatches:

- `set_member_role(p_user_id, p_new_role)` — admin+ only. Blocks
  promotion to / demotion from owner (use transfer instead) and
  self-targeting.
- `remove_account_member(p_user_id)` — admin+ only. Creates a
  fresh personal account for the removed user and reassigns
  their profile as its 'owner' — mirror of the signup flow, so
  they keep their login and just "start over". Blocks removing
  the owner or self.
- `transfer_account_ownership(p_new_owner_user_id)` — owner only.
  Atomically demotes current owner → admin, promotes target →
  owner, and points accounts.owner_user_id at the new owner.
  Demote-first ordering means the temporary "zero owners" state
  is never visible.

Error contract
- Each RPC raises with SQLSTATE 42501 (forbidden) or 22023 (bad
  input) and a human-readable RAISE message. The route handlers
  map these onto 403 / 400 respectively; anything else collapses
  to a generic 500.
- The TS guards (e.g. `requireRole('owner')` on the transfer
  route, `isAccountRole(role)` on the PATCH route) are
  belt-and-braces — they fail fast before the Supabase round
  trip but the RPCs would catch the same violations regardless.

Field visibility
- `GET /api/account/members` returns `email` only when the
  caller is admin+. Agents and viewers see name + avatar + role
  + joined date — matches the planning decision so a viewer
  can't harvest the team's email list.

Verification
- `npm run lint`      → 0 errors (same 20 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test`          → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build`     → succeeds; the 4 new routes register as ƒ
                        (dynamic — they all use `next/headers`
                        cookies via the SSR client)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 15:00:27 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
2f0334b0de
feat(db): account-sharing schema foundation
Turns every wacrm install multi-tenant on the database side. A single
user's signup now creates an `accounts` row, links the profile to it
as `owner`, and every domain row is scoped via a new `account_id`
column instead of `user_id`.

Why now: the next handful of PRs add the invite/members user surface
(gated by the `account_sharing` beta flag); that surface needs RLS to
already speak "membership" rather than "ownership". Doing the schema
flip in isolation keeps the diff reviewable and lets the follow-up
PRs stay focused on TS/UI.

What the migration does:
- Introduces `account_role_enum` + `accounts` + `account_invitations`.
- Adds `account_id` to every parent tenant table (16 tables incl.
  profiles) and `account_role` to profiles.
- Backfills one account per existing user, then sets NOT NULL.
- Replaces every `auth.uid() = user_id` RLS policy with a membership
  check via a SECURITY DEFINER `is_account_member(account_id, min)`
  helper. Three tiers: viewers read, agents write operational data,
  admins write settings-class tables (whatsapp_config, templates,
  pipelines, tags, custom_fields).
- Swaps `whatsapp_config.UNIQUE(user_id)` → `UNIQUE(account_id)` and
  `flow_runs` active-run idempotency key to `(account_id, contact_id)`.
- Replaces `handle_new_user` so new signups bootstrap their own
  account atomically.

Backwards compatibility: every existing user is the sole `owner` of
their freshly-created account, every existing row is linked to it,
and the legacy `user_id` columns stay (still used for assignment /
audit, no longer for isolation). Net behavioural change on its own:
zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 12:59:07 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
78e0f25911
docs(changelog): 0.2.2 — send_media flow node + migration 016
New users / self-hosters pulling this version need to apply migration
016 before deploying — the entry flags it under "Migration required"
and explains exactly what it does (CHECK constraint + storage bucket
+ RLS policies) so the operator knows why each piece exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 19:22:22 +02:00
Arnas Donauskas
ec91cc3382
docs: changelog for 0.2.1 (whatsapp_config single-tenant fix)
PATCH bump for the bug fix in #143 (closes #136). Surfaces the
required migration (013_whatsapp_config_phone_number_id_unique.sql)
and the diagnostic SQL self-hosters should run before applying it,
plus a note that wacrm is single-tenant per WhatsApp number by
design.
2026-05-26 11:26:17 +02:00
Arnas Donauskas
f40c6becde
docs: changelog for 0.2.0 (Flows + color themes + soft-GA)
Versions the prior `## Unreleased` chat-actions block as 0.1.1 (it
shipped with migration 009 a few days back) and adds 0.2.0 covering
the Flows feature, color themes, and the various engine + UX work
that landed alongside.

Also bumps package.json: 0.1.0 → 0.2.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 17:23:09 +03:00
Arnas Donauskas
faa128f0fd
docs: add CHANGELOG with migration-required note
Self-hosters pulling updates have no signal today that a new release
needs a Supabase migration applied — they only find out when /react
starts returning 500s in prod. CHANGELOG.md fixes that for v-current
(chat actions, requires migration 009) and gives future entries a home.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-19 16:39:16 +03:00