The send_webhook automation step fetched an account-controlled URL with
attacker-controlled headers and no SSRF protection, following redirects
by default — letting an agent+ reach cloud metadata (169.254.169.254),
loopback, and RFC1918 hosts from the server's network (status code
surfaces in automation logs). The separate webhook_endpoints delivery
path already guards this; the automation path did not.
Route send_webhook through the existing isDeliverableUrl guard before the
fetch, and mirror the deliver.ts hardening: redirect: 'manual' (a public
URL can't 3xx-bounce to an internal one) and a 10s timeout. Add an engine
regression test asserting a link-local target never reaches fetch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Update Contact Field" automation action could only write the built-in
name/email/company columns. This wires up the existing custom_fields /
contact_custom_values tables so automations can read and update arbitrary
custom fields, and adds the missing UI to define them.
- Add a "Custom fields" manager dialog on the Contacts page (admin+ gated)
to create / rename / delete field definitions. Inserts carry account_id.
- Load account custom fields into the automation builder's ResourcesContext
and offer them in the Field dropdown, encoded as `custom:<id>`. A saved
field that's since been deleted is preserved as an "(unknown field)"
option so editing doesn't silently drop it.
- Engine: interpolate the value ({{ vars.* }} / {{ message.text }}) for all
fields, and for `custom:<id>` verify the field belongs to the automation's
account (defense in depth) before upserting into contact_custom_values.
- Tests: cover the custom-value upsert, variable interpolation, and
cross-account rejection.
Closes#235
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The automation engine executes steps via the service-role client, which
bypasses RLS. POST /api/automations/engine reads contact_id straight from
the request body, so an authenticated attacker could supply another
tenant's contact UUID and have the engine modify it (update_contact_field),
tag it, or read it back through a condition — bypassing the contacts RLS
policy. (GHSA-63cv-2c49-m5v3)
- Primary: verify the supplied contactId belongs to the dispatching
account before any step runs; refuse silently otherwise.
- Defense in depth: scope the service-role contacts writes/reads
(update_contact_field, contact_field condition) by account_id. Tag
steps rely on the entry-point guard since contact_tags has no
account_id column — documented inline.
- Add engine.test.ts covering the guard (PoC inverted), the happy path,
and the account-scoped write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
