PR 3 of the multi-user accounts series. Lands the server-side
endpoints the upcoming Members tab UI will call. Built on the
helpers from #169 (`requireRole`, `getCurrentAccount`,
`toErrorResponse`).
API surface
- GET /api/account — caller's account + role
- PATCH /api/account — rename (admin+)
- GET /api/account/members — roster; email visible to admin+ only
- PATCH /api/account/members/[userId] — change role (admin+)
- DELETE /api/account/members/[userId] — remove (admin+)
- POST /api/account/transfer-ownership — atomic owner handoff (owner)
Member-role writes can't ride on the regular `profiles_update` RLS
policy (which only allows self-edits — admins can't modify a
teammate's row that way). The three SECURITY DEFINER RPCs in the
new migration are the scoped escape hatches:
- `set_member_role(p_user_id, p_new_role)` — admin+ only. Blocks
promotion to / demotion from owner (use transfer instead) and
self-targeting.
- `remove_account_member(p_user_id)` — admin+ only. Creates a
fresh personal account for the removed user and reassigns
their profile as its 'owner' — mirror of the signup flow, so
they keep their login and just "start over". Blocks removing
the owner or self.
- `transfer_account_ownership(p_new_owner_user_id)` — owner only.
Atomically demotes current owner → admin, promotes target →
owner, and points accounts.owner_user_id at the new owner.
Demote-first ordering means the temporary "zero owners" state
is never visible.
Error contract
- Each RPC raises with SQLSTATE 42501 (forbidden) or 22023 (bad
input) and a human-readable RAISE message. The route handlers
map these onto 403 / 400 respectively; anything else collapses
to a generic 500.
- The TS guards (e.g. `requireRole('owner')` on the transfer
route, `isAccountRole(role)` on the PATCH route) are
belt-and-braces — they fail fast before the Supabase round
trip but the RPCs would catch the same violations regardless.
Field visibility
- `GET /api/account/members` returns `email` only when the
caller is admin+. Agents and viewers see name + avatar + role
+ joined date — matches the planning decision so a viewer
can't harvest the team's email list.
Verification
- `npm run lint` → 0 errors (same 20 pre-existing warnings)
- `npm run typecheck` → clean
- `npm test` → 366/366 pass
- `npm run build` → succeeds; the 4 new routes register as ƒ
(dynamic — they all use `next/headers`
cookies via the SSR client)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
