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fix(automations): atomic execution_count via SQL function (migration 007)
The engine did a client-side read-modify-write on automations.execution_count, so two concurrent dispatches of the same automation (e.g. fired for two different contacts within the same second) could both read N and both write N+1, permanently losing one count. - Migration 007 adds increment_automation_execution_count(p_automation_id) as a SECURITY DEFINER sql function. Only service_role can EXECUTE it — an authenticated user can't juice someone else's counter by calling the RPC directly. - Engine now calls this RPC instead of reading automation.execution_count and adding 1. Atomic in one statement; concurrent dispatches both land correctly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -159,13 +159,16 @@ async function executeAutomation(automation: Automation, input: DispatchInput) {
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triggerEvent: input.triggerType,
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})
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await db
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.from('automations')
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.update({
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execution_count: (automation.execution_count ?? 0) + 1,
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last_executed_at: new Date().toISOString(),
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// Atomic counter update via the SQL function from migration 007.
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// Doing this with a client-side read-modify-write raced when the
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// same automation fired for two contacts simultaneously — both
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// would read N and both write N+1, losing one count permanently.
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const { error: rpcErr } = await db.rpc('increment_automation_execution_count', {
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p_automation_id: automation.id,
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})
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.eq('id', automation.id)
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if (rpcErr) {
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console.error('[automations] increment counter failed:', rpcErr)
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}
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}
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interface ExecuteArgs {
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35
supabase/migrations/007_automations_increment_counter.sql
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35
supabase/migrations/007_automations_increment_counter.sql
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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-- ============================================================
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-- 007_automations_increment_counter.sql
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--
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-- Atomic increment of automations.execution_count + refresh of
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-- last_executed_at. Called via PostgREST RPC from the engine.
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--
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-- Before this, the engine did a read-modify-write:
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-- UPDATE automations SET execution_count = <cached + 1> WHERE id = ...
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-- so two concurrent dispatches (e.g. the same automation firing for
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-- two different contacts in the same second) could both read N and
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-- both write N+1, permanently losing one count.
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--
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-- Idempotent — safe to re-run.
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-- ============================================================
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION increment_automation_execution_count(p_automation_id UUID)
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RETURNS VOID
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LANGUAGE sql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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UPDATE automations
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SET
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execution_count = execution_count + 1,
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last_executed_at = NOW()
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WHERE id = p_automation_id;
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$$;
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-- Only the service role needs to call this (engine uses the
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-- service-role client). Explicitly lock anon / authenticated out so
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-- an authenticated user can't juice someone else's counter via RPC.
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION increment_automation_execution_count(UUID) FROM PUBLIC;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION increment_automation_execution_count(UUID) FROM anon;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION increment_automation_execution_count(UUID) FROM authenticated;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION increment_automation_execution_count(UUID) TO service_role;
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